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ABSTRACT 
 
Preferences for Employment Protection and the 
Insider-Outsider Divide 
 
Insider-outsider theory suggests that in dual labour markets two groups have opposing 
preferences regarding protection against dismissals: insiders defend employment protection, 
because it increases their rents. Outsiders see it as a mobility barrier and demand 
deregulation. Similar divides are expected for unemployment benefits: as insiders and 
outsiders have diverging unemployment risks, they should demand different levels of 
protection. Although these views are influential in the political economy debate, there is little 
empirical research on the effect of contract types on social and labour market policy 
preferences. We use a novel data set collected in the most recent presidential contest in 
France, which combines detailed information on respondents’ employment status with 
questions measuring attitudes towards dismissal regulation and other labour market policies. 
Going beyond insider-outsider theory, we argue and show empirically that the effect of 
membership in either segment is moderated by the employment situation in workers’ 
occupation. 
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Introduction 
 
Prominent political economy theories deal with the question of what determines individuals’ 
preferences for or against employment protection. It has been suggested that in dual labour 
markets two groups oppose each other whose interests are irreconcilable: while insiders (those 
with permanent employment contracts) defend dismissal regulation because it increases their 
rents, outsiders (the unemployed and temporary workers) see it as a mobility barrier to the 
primary labour market segment and demand deregulation (Rueda 2005; 2007; Saint-Paul 1996).  
This theoretically influential argument has so far not been tested directly. The main reason 
arguably is a lack of suitable data, as survey questions measuring support for employment 
protection are rare. In this paper, we overcome this problem by using a novel data set collected in 
the most recent presidential contest in France (Guillaud and Sauger 2013), which combines 
detailed information on respondents’ employment status with questions measuring attitudes 
towards dismissal regulation and other labour market policies. France is a particularly interesting 
case, since employment protection has ranked high on the political agenda for decades 
(Blanchard and Tirole 2003). Moreover, at the time of data collection concrete reform options 
were discussed in the French media, ensuring that the topic was salient to the voters.  
The results disconfirm the theoretical argument that temporary workers demand de-regulation of 
employment protection. Permanent and temporary workers do not have significantly different 
preferences on this particular issue. Where they do differ, however, is regarding preferences for 
generosity of unemployment benefits. Outsiders, including temporary workers, demand more 
unemployment protection. In sum, the results reaffirm scepticism on political behaviour 
implications of insider-outsider theory and lend support to recent theorizing on the link between 
employment risks and welfare state preferences (Cusack et al. 2006; Hacker et al. 2013; Rehm 
2009).   
Moreover, our results indicate insider-outsider conceptualisation based on employment contract 
to be too narrow to capture preferences for employment protection (for a related argument see 
Häusermann and Schwander 2012). Workers formally belonging to the insider segment can be 
sheltered from unemployment because of the favourable labour demand and supply conditions in 
their occupations. Going beyond insider-outsider theory, we argue and show empirically that the 
effect of membership in either segment is moderated by occupational unemployment rates. In 
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occupations with low unemployment, permanent workers exhibit lower support for employment 
protection. 
 
Labour market status and preferences for employment protection 
 
Employment (or dismissal) protection comprises regulations constraining managerial freedom to 
fire workers at will (Venn 2009). As such it is an institution beneficial to workers and cherished 
by trade unions (Botero et al. 2004; Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013). Saint-Paul (1996; 2000) 
argues, however, that such regulations are not in the interest of the entire working class. 
Employment protection is beneficial to the employed, because it increases costs of firing them 
after failed wage negotiations and therefore allows to “artificially create monopoly power” 
(Saint-Paul 2000: 270) and bidding up wages (see also Lindbeck and Snower 1988; 2001). 
Moreover, there is a sizeable group of low-productivity workers whose jobs would be destroyed 
in the absence of employment protection. The losers of employment protection are the 
unemployed, for whom regulations imply lower job finding rates (since employers are more 
hesitant to make potentially costly commitments to long-term employment) (Bentolila and 
Bertola 1990). The argument has been extended to include non-standard workers into the 
category of outsiders (primarily those on temporary employment contracts) (Bentolila and 
Dolado 1994; Dolado et al. 2002; Rueda 2005). Also for them dismissal regulation does not 
serve as a protective institution, but as a mobility barrier into the primary labour market segment. 
In sum, outsiders’ demands for deregulation are “justified by their beliefs that lower employment 
protection will facilitate their exit from unemployment and precarious employment” (Rueda 
2005: 64). From this perspective, we can hypothesise that the (permanently) employed should 
have a stronger preference for maintaining employment protection than the unemployed and 
workers on temporary contracts. 
The model has been contested on theoretical grounds. Emmenegger (2009) is agnostic about the 
explanatory power of labour market status for preferences for dismissal regulation, because first, 
voters are rarely rational or sophisticated enough to make the necessary calculations of 
institutional effects on their welfare; second, labour market divides run through household units 
which may blur the conflict over employment protection; and third, prospects of upward mobility 
may lead outsiders to anticipate and adopt insider preferences. In addition, Emmenegger (2009) 
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and Marx (forthcoming) point to open questions in how outsiders in the model translate policy 
preferences into party support: Saint-Paul (1996) as well as Rueda (2005) argue that next to 
employment protection, insiders and outsider also diverge on how much to spend on unemployed 
benefits. Insiders face low unemployment risks and prefer relatively little spending, outsiders 
face high risks and demand more spending. This squares well with the literature stipulating a 
positive effect of employment risks on welfare state preferences (Cusack et al. 2006; Guillaud 
2013; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009). The problem is that the specific policy mix of 
deregulating employment protection and increasing unemployment protection can rarely be 
found in political manifestos. Typically parties are either supportive (the left) or hostile (the 
right) towards both policies at the same time. This implies that outsiders have to prioritize 
between their assumed preference for employment protection deregulation and unemployment 
protection expansion. The insider-outsider model does not provide a theoretical prediction which 
issue will dominate in voters’ decision making. 
Empirically, to our knowledge the claim of lower support for employment protection among 
outsiders has not been addressed directly. Tentative support comes from Dolado et al. (2002) as 
well as Bentolila et al. (2012) who show for Spain that deregulation of employment protection 
has occurred in times in which outsiders outnumber insiders. Micro level evidence is limited. 
Using two ISSP questions (government support for declining industries and personal importance 
of job security) Emmenegger (2009) shows that atypical workers indeed show less support for 
employment protection compared to insiders. The unemployed, however, are equally supportive 
as insiders. Marx (forthcoming) does not find any positive effect of temporary contracts (vs. 
permanent ones) on support for conservative or liberal parties, which are the most likely party 
families to deregulate labour markets. However, his finding of a positive effect on support for 
Green parties could indicate that temporary workers prefer left parties with less historical 
commitment to employment protection than it is characteristic for Social Democracy. In any 
case, one should bear in mind that party support as well as the items used by Emmenegger 
(2009) are not more than crude proxies for support of employment protection. Evidence on 
outsiders’ higher demand for unemployment protection has been provided by Boeri et al. (2001), 
Burgoon and Dekker (2010), and Marx (forthcoming). 
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The bottom line is that we have little empirical knowledge on the effect of labour market status 
on preferences for or against employment protection. In the remainder of the paper, we will 
analyse two hypotheses: 
 
1. Compared to insiders, outsiders demand a lower level of employment protection 
2. Compared to insiders, outsiders demand a higher level of unemployment benefits 
 
Going beyond these straightforward hypotheses, we propose a theoretical extension of insider-
outsider theory. In our view, insider-outsider theory neglects important heterogeneity within both 
segments and exaggerates mobility barriers between them. In reality, insiders do become 
unemployed and temporary workers as well as unemployed can find permanent jobs (Gash 
2008). However, regarding actual prospects of upward (or downward) mobility, temporary 
workers are a heterogeneous group and the same is true for the unemployment risk of permanent 
workers (Rehm 2009). Besides individual factors a major factor explaining this heterogeneity 
should be occupational risk profiles (ibid.).  
What are the consequences for support of employment protection? If, for instance, workers’ 
occupations are characterized by favourable labour demand and supply conditions, neither 
category has to worry all that much about unemployment (and employment protection). We 
would expect the preferences for employment protection to be more polarized in occupational 
groups with a shortage of jobs. Here, temporary workers have relatively weak prospects of 
making an upward transition. Rather than anticipating future ‘insiderness’, they anticipate 
unemployment and their opposition to employment protection may even grow (following the 
‘mobility barrier hypothesis’). In any case, they currently do not benefit from employment 
protection and the occupational employment situation does not produce additional incentives to 
support it. The situation is reversed for the permanent workers. The more adverse the 
occupational employment situation, the stronger the support for employment protection. For 
many of these workers employment protection is the only thing standing between them and 
unemployment and is probably seen as the single most important piece of labour market 
regulation. Hence, we expect: 
  
5 
 
3. Permanent workers facing high occupational unemployment exhibit stronger support for 
employment protection, whereas temporary workers’ support is not affected or even 
lower. 
 
The French reform debate and the contrat de travail unique 
 
We analyse our hypothesis in the context of an on-going reform debate in France. The French 
labour market exemplifies a two-contract regime (DiPrete et al. 2006; Palier and Thelen 2010). It 
is characterized by strict regulation of dismissals for open-ended contracts (Venn 2009) and the 
frequent use of fixed-term contracts (contrat à durée determine or CDD). Although the share of 
fixed-term workers equals only 10% of the French workforce, more than 70% of new hirings are 
made through fixed-term contracts. Such contracts are often associated with unfavourable labour 
market outcomes, such as wage gaps and lack of occupational upward mobility (Blanchard and 
Landier 2002; Gash 2008). Particularly younger and low-skilled workers are affected. Regarding 
workers between 15 and 24 years, only 47.8% have an open-ended contract in France, compared 
to an average of 75.9% in the OECD (Cahuc and Kramarz 2004).  
In combination with persistently high unemployment rates, growing labour market dualism has 
produced more than three decades of reform debates about employment protection. Arguments 
and policy changes have generally oscillated between fostering general flexibility by 
deregulating dismissal regulation, increasing dualism by selectively deregulating fixed-term 
contracts, or overcoming dualism by making it more costly to hire on fixed-term contracts (Marx 
2012). Hence, employment protection has been a salient political issue for a long time. Cases in 
point are the employment protection reforms proposed in 2005 by the conservative government. 
The contrat première embauche (for young workers) and the contrat nouvelle embauche (for 
workers in very small firms) were intended to allow firms laying off workers during the first two 
years of employment without the usual restrictions. After this period, the contract would be 
converted into a permanent one. Following major street protests, implementation of both types of 
contracts eventually failed. The general idea of eliminating the “sharp contrasts” (Blanchard and 
Tirole 2003: 39) between temporary and permanent contracts remained however on the political 
agenda (Cahuc and Kramarz 2004; LIEPP/OECD 2013; Amable 2013). Creating a single 
employment contract (or contrat de travail unique), which would replace the existing two types 
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of contracts but would be more flexible than permanent contracts in the status quo, was part of 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s program for the presidential campaign in 2007, and François Bayrou’s 
program for the 2012 contest. 
We make use of the visible reform debate on the single employment contract in France to 
analyse preferences for employment protection. Our general hypothesis can be straightforwardly 
translated into the French context: Compared to insiders (permanent workers), outsiders (fixed-
term contract workers and the unemployed) should be in favour of the single employment 
contract. This is simply because the new contract would make it easier for them to obtain a 
permanent contract in the future. Permanent workers should oppose the idea since they would 
have to compromise on their current level of protection. 
 
Data 
 
We use a survey of 2014 registered voters collected after the second round of the 2012 French 
presidential election.1 To assess the support for employment protection, we make use of a 
question on the single labour contract that reads as follows: “Would you be in favour of or 
against the establishment of a single employment contract replacing the fixed term contracts and 
permanent employment contract? It would become easier to fire someone with this type of single 
employment contract than to fire someone with a permanent employment contract but the 
severance payments would increase with seniority.” The precise wording of the question avoids 
any misunderstanding regarding the implications of the single labour contract on employment 
protection. We thus use the answers to this question to assess the support for employment 
protection (dummy), assuming that individuals that are not in favour of the single labour contract 
do instead value employment protection.  
Our key explanatory variable is individuals’ employment status. Corresponding to our 
hypotheses, we distinguish permanent and temporary contracts. Among the former we make an 
additional distinction between full time and part time. It is often argued that only permanent full 
time workers can be considered real labour market insiders. We further distinguish the 
unemployed, the civil servants, and the inactive. Missing values are included into the regressions 
                                                 
1 This survey has been conducted in the framework of the project ‘The political economy of the 2012 election’ (PI 
Nicolas Sauger), funded by the Mairie de Paris (research programme Emergences) and Sciences Po. 
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to avoid potential bias through a reduced sample (but not shown in the regression output). The 
distribution of attitudes towards the single employment contract by labour market status is shown 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of answers on the single labour contract by employment status 
employment status  in favour strongly in favour against strongly against total 
permanent full time 6.61 28.02 37.36 28.02 100 
permanent part time 10.26 29.49 34.62 25.64 100 
fixed term 6.74 25.84 38.20 29.21 100 
self employed 20.29 33.33 28.99 17.39 100 
unemployed 13.28 32.03 25.78 28.91 100 
inactive 11.19 41.01 26.23 21.57 100 
civil servant 3.61 27.11 43.98 25.30 100 
missing value 10.81   32.43  35.14  21.62  100 
total 9.56 34.04 31.93 24.47 100 
 
We also investigate whether the insider/outsider divides helps explain the support for 
unemployment insurance. The survey question we use reads as follows: “Concerning the 
spending on policies on unemployment insurance and job training for the unemployed, should 
there be much more, somewhat more, the same, somewhat less or much less spending than 
now?”. The question is clearly in relative terms. We thus interpret individuals answering there 
should be (much) more spending on unemployment insurance as people showing a strong 
support for unemployment benefits given the actual insurance level (dummy). The distribution of 
attitudes towards unemployment insurance by labour market status is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of answers on level of unemployment insurance by employment status 
 employment status  much more more the same less much less total 
permanent full time 14.41 30.16 34.81 15.96 4.66 100 
permanent part time 14.29 30.95 36.90 13.10 4.76 100 
fixed term 14.29 44.90 29.59 11.22 0.00 100 
self employed 8.00 30.67 28.00 26.67 6.67 100 
unemployed 28.57 37.86 23.57 7.86 2.14 100 
inactive 14.17 35.66 34.74 12.34 3.09 100 
civil servant 18.54 33.15 34.83 11.80 1.69 100 
missing value 20.51 25.64 38.46 10.26 5.13 100 
total 15.57 34.18 33.61 13.30 3.35 100 
 
In all regressions, we control for age, gender, union membership, education, and income 
(adjusted to household size). Additional controls include self-placement on the left-right scale 
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(dummy for left-wing ideology), occupation dummies, self-reported household income dynamics 
in the past 12 months, and subjective employability (whether respondents consider it difficult to 
find another job within 12 months in case of job loss). 
 
Results 
 
Table 3 presents results of regressions of employment protection preferences on labour market 
status and a range of control variables. The findings do not support the hypothesis derived from 
the insider-outsider literature: there is no significant difference between workers with permanent 
and fixed-term contracts. This is robust to adding several controls (models 1-3). However we do 
find a clear divide between wage-earners and the groups of self-employed and unemployed 
respondents. Both groups are significantly more in favour of a more flexible single employment 
contract. This is not surprising for the self-employed who often employ dependent workers 
themselves. The strong and significant effect for the unemployed indicates that the insider-
outsider argument is relevant for this group. Interestingly, the unemployed and the self-employed 
seem to converge on the issue of employment protection. Finally, the negative effect for the 
inactive may be caused by pensioners who do not directly benefit (anymore) from employment 
protection. This interpretation also explains the negative effect of being older than age 54. 
Among the remaining control variables, only skill level is significant. As could be expected, 
support for employment protection decreases with skill level and increases with left wing 
ideology. Somewhat surprisingly, union membership is not a significant predictor of 
employment protection preferences. 
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Table 3. Preferences for employment protection (binary logit) 
  employment protection 
  model 1 model 2 model 3 
permanent full time -REF . . . 
permanent part time -.249 -.150 -.133 
  (.249) (.255) (.257) 
fixed term -.082 -.088 -.106 
  (.236) (.241) (.243) 
self employed -.734*** -.598** -.569* 
  (.257) (.298) (.299) 
unemployed -.569*** -.570*** -.641*** 
  (.201) (.203) (.205) 
inactive -.430*** -.458** -.437** 
  (.147) (.178) (.180) 
civil servant .126 .102 .113 
  (.191) (.207) (.208) 
young (18-34) -REF . . . 
middle age (35-54) -.100 -.080 -.045 
  (.138) (.141) (.142) 
old (>54) -.763*** -.717*** -.726*** 
  (.150) (.174) (.176) 
female -.137 -.063 -.039 
  (.096) (.109) (.109) 
union member .300* .252 .174 
  (.181) (.183) (.185) 
education <= bac -REF . . . 
undergraduate .282** .254* .240* 
  (.130) (.144) (.145) 
graduate -.491*** -.374* -.428** 
  (.166) (.206) (.209) 
low income -REF . . . 
middle income .049 .059 .080 
  (.108) (.111) (.112) 
high income -.363* -.317 -.236 
  (.214) (.221) (.223) 
left ideology     .525*** 
      (.098) 
occupation dummies   yes   yes 
Number of Obs. 2014 2014 2014 
Pseudo R-Sq. .063 .072 .082 
Log likelihood -1307.5 -1295.1 -1280.7 
Chi 2 176.54 201.30 230.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In Table 4 we present results for the dependent variable measuring preferences for 
unemployment benefits. Again, the unemployed show a highly significant coefficient, as 
expected with a positive sign (indicating stronger support for unemployment benefits). Contrary 
to what we found for employment protection preferences, temporary workers show a similar 
preference pattern this time. Albeit somewhat weaker, their coefficient is significant and positive 
across model specifications. Besides labour market status, low income and left wing ideology are 
strong predictors of preferences for unemployment benefits. 
The results suggest that insider-outsider differences have stronger implications for welfare state 
demand than for attitudes towards labour market regulation, at least regarding temporary 
workers. This is plausible, since temporary employment has been shown to be a strong predictor 
of subjective and factual unemployment risk (Burgoon and Dekker 2010; Gash 2008). 
Nonetheless, it may be that the dummy for temporary employment picks up other factors 
explaining preferences for unemployment benefits. This is plausible since employment risks, 
including temporary employment, are clustered in certain occupations (Rehm 2009; 2011) and 
these may differ by additional explanatory variables. To account for this, we first add two 
subjective measures of social risks: whether it would be difficult for respondents to find another 
job within 12 months if they would lose their present job (dummy) and whether their household 
income decreased in the past 12 months (dummy). Both questions differ from short term 
unemployment risk which is arguably underlying the positive effect of temporary employment. 
The first variable captures employability, i.e. re-employment chances in case of job loss, which 
is a function of individuals’ human capital (specificity) and occupational patterns of labour 
demand and supply. The second variable is concerned with (the experience of) negative income 
dynamics. Both variables have a significant effect in the expected direction, but they do not 
explain away the positive effect of temporary employment (model 2). In a next step, we include 
dummies for different occupational groups to account for any unobservable and observable 
heterogeneity on this level (model 3). Although this slightly diminishes the effect of temporary 
contracts, it remains significant. We hence conclude that temporary employment has an 
independent effect on preferences for unemployment benefits. 
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Table 4. Preferences for unemployment benefits (binary logit) 
  unemployment benefits 
  model 1 model 2 model 3 
permanent full time -REF . . . 
permanent part time -.078 -.102 -.111 
  (.243) (.245) (.252) 
fixed term .542** .514** .414* 
  (.232) (.234) (.241) 
self employed -.293 -.283 -.052 
  (.257) (.263) (.300) 
unemployed .782*** .949*** .872*** 
  (.205) (.224) (.230) 
inactive .046 .295* .217 
  (.145) (.171) (.200) 
civil servant .239 .272 .127 
  (.182) (.184) (.202) 
young (18-34) -REF . . . 
middle age (35-54) .069 .047 .078 
  (.136) (.137) (.141) 
old (>54) .146 .106 .167 
  (.148) (.149) (.175) 
female .101 .086 .013 
  (.094) (.094) (.108) 
union member .307* .266 .116 
  (.173) (.174) (.179) 
education <= bac -REF . . . 
undergraduate .011 .033 -.108 
  (.126) (.127) (.144) 
graduate .073 .065 .000 
  (.161) (.162) (.206) 
low income -REF . . . 
middle income -.373*** -.340*** -.334*** 
  (.105) (.106) (.111) 
high income -1.035*** -.967*** -.897*** 
  (.216) (.218) (.228) 
hh income decreased past 12 months   .258** .241** 
    (.102) (.105) 
difficult to find another job   .413*** .361** 
    (.137) (.141) 
left ideology     .628*** 
      (.096) 
occupation dummies     yes 
Number of Obs. 2014 2014 2014 
Pseudo R-Sq. .024 .030 .055 
Log likelihood -1360.3 -1352.4 -1317.0 
Chi 2 67.94 83.67 154.55 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Occupational risk profiles 
 
In the previous section, we showed that permanent and temporary workers do not differ in their 
support for employment protection. This finding may disguise considerable heterogeneity within 
both segments. We argue that occupational risk profiles are a relevant source of heterogeneity. 
According to our argument, permanent workers in high-risk occupation should exhibit stronger 
support for employment protection than permanent workers in low-risk occupations. Temporary 
workers in high-risk occupations, on the other hand, should exhibit the same or even lower 
support for employment protection than temporary workers in low-risk occupations.  
We analyse this assertion by including a multiplicative interaction term of employment status 
and occupational unemployment rate (OUER). The OUER was calculated as in Rehm (2009) 
based on the French labour force survey (Enquete emploi 2011).2 Unfortunately, the size of our 
data set is not very suitable to explore interaction effects. Excluding the inactive, civil servants 
and self-employed (who are, for different reasons, not affected by the risk of unemployment) 
reduces our sample size to 781. Among these, we only distinguish permanent workers, temporary 
workers and the unemployed. The absolute number of observed temporary workers is only about 
100. This means that we have relatively few observations for any given level of OUER 
producing large confidence intervals. As a consequence of these data limitations, we cannot test 
our third hypothesis rigorously, but restrict ourselves to cautiously assessing whether the 
tendency in the data is in line with our expectations. 
Figure 1 plots the average probabilities of permanent and temporary workers as well as of the 
unemployed to support employment protection over the range of observed OUER values (based 
on the interaction term in Table A3 in the appendix). To begin with, the difference between 
permanent and temporary workers is not significant at any level of OUER. However, we do 
observe the expected tendency of permanent workers to show stronger support for employment 
protection in high-risk occupations. The gap in support between the highest and the smallest 
OUER is about eleven percentage points. Almost the exact opposite is true for temporary 
workers. In high-risk occupations, they tend to converge to the (low) level of support observed 
among the unemployed. Again, we have to treat this second finding with caution, since it is 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Baptiste Françon for sharing this data with us. We checked the accuracy of the data by using 
occupation to predict individuals’ transitions into unemployment with data from Enquete emploi 2011. The results 
(obtainable upon request) validate the occupational unemployment rates we use in this article. 
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based on a rather small number of observations. The unemployed generally seem to be 
unaffected by occupational unemployment rates, as their level of support hardly differs. 
 
Figure 1. Average probabilities to support employment protection over different levels of 
occupational unemployment rates 
 
Note: average probabilities based on Table A3 in the appendix. Dotted lines represent 90 per cent confidence 
interval for permanent workers. Unemployed assigned to occupation of last job. 
 
 
What can we conclude from these observations? The analysis reveals that permanent workers do 
not hold uniform preferences for or against employment protection. Support is higher if the 
employment situation is bad. Moreover, the data suggests that this logic is different among 
temporary workers. Under the condition of high OUER the gap in the level of support is wider. 
Although data constraints do not allow for firmer conclusions, our results can be seen as a 
plausibility check for the theoretical assertion that insider-outsider divides in policy preferences 
are conditioned by the broader risk environment. 
 
14 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have investigated a prominent claim of the insider-outsider literature, according 
to which there is a divide in the population regarding preferences for employment protection. On 
the one side, permanently employed insiders are expected to support strong protection against 
dismissals. On the other side, the unemployed and temporary workers are supposed to support 
deregulation to foster labour market mobility. Using data from the most recent presidential 
election in France, a country which has been in the focus of insider-outsider literature, we could 
only confirm the argument for the unemployed. Temporary workers do not differ significantly 
from permanent workers regarding preferences for employment protection. This has two likely 
causes. First, as has been frequently pointed out, temporary workers may be too heterogeneous in 
their prospects of upward mobility. Some may anticipate prospective permanent employment and 
therefore adopt ‘insider preferences’ early on. The complementary second likely reason why we 
do not observe a clear gap is heterogeneity among permanent workers. There may be a sizeable 
segment in the group of permanent workers with only lukewarm support for employment 
protection as a consequence of high employability and/or favourable economic environment in 
their industry. Other permanent workers may deem their unemployment risk as high and consider 
their personal prospects in the external labour market as poor and therefore strongly support 
protection of existing jobs. Both types of heterogeneity appear plausible based on the observed 
interaction of employment status and occupational unemployment rates. We think that 
incorporating broader conceptions of risk into theories on insiders’ and outsiders’ political 
preferences is a promising way to further the debate. While we have analysed an objective risk 
factor as a moderator of employment status, exploring different forms of subjective mobility 
prospects are interesting alternatives for future research. 
Our results do show that temporary employment matters more when it comes to welfare state 
demand. It appears that unemployment risk and the need for decent protection are more salient 
implications of temporary workers than calculations of mobility prospect. Therefore, our results 
suggest that in a European context temporary employment should receive more attention in the 
burgeoning literature on the effects of employment risk on policy preferences. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
  n freq (%) N 
Support for employment protection 991  49,21   2014 
Support for unemployment benefits 965   47,91 2014  
Detailed employment status: last 7 days       
permanent full time 462 22,94 2014 
permanent part time 85 4,22 2014 
fixed term 99 4,92 2014 
self employed 78 3,87 2014 
unemployed 142 7,05 2014 
inactive 926 45,98 2014 
civil servant 183 9,09 2014 
missing values 39 1,94 2014 
Age       
young (18-34) 370 18,44 2014 
middle-age (35-54) 711 35,44 2014 
old (>54) 925 46,11 2014 
missing values 8 0,40 2014 
Female  1110  55,11 2014  
Union member 160  7,94  2014  
University degree       
baccalaureate or less 1395 69,27 2014 
undergraduate (L) 376 18,67 2014 
graduate (M-D) 228 11,32 2014 
missing values 15 0,74 2014 
Income (adjusted)       
low-income 762 37,84 2014 
middle-income 957 47,52 2014 
high-income 139 6,90 2014 
missing values 156 7,75 2014 
Negative past income mobility (12 months)  605  30,04 2014  
Difficult to find another job (> 12 months) 526  26,12   2014 
Occupation       
skilled agricultural worker 32 1,59 2014 
craftmen 55 2,73 2014 
shopkeepers 40 1,99 2014 
CEO 11 0,55 2014 
liberal professions 17 0,84 2014 
managers -public sector 138 6,85 2014 
managers -private firm 120 5,96 2014 
associate professionals -public sector 184 9,14 2014 
associate professionals -private firms 87 4,32 2014 
technicians 66 3,28 2014 
foremen 50 2,48 2014 
service workers -public sector 219 10,87 2014 
service workers -private firms 138 6,85 2014 
sales workers 80 3,97 2014 
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personal workers 114 5,66 2014 
plant and machine operators 238 11,82 2014 
elementary occupations 150 7,45 2014 
agricultural workers 15 0,74 2014 
missing values 260 12,91 2014 
Left ideology 866 43,00 2014 
Source: 2012 French election survey; Enquete Emploi 2011     
 
 
 
Table A2. Occupational unemployment rate 
Occupation Unemployment rate 
skilled agricultural worker 0,27 
craftmen 3,43 
shopkeepers 5,09 
CEO 1,81 
liberal professions 1,73 
managers -public sector 3,08 
managers -private firm 4,29 
associate professionals -public sector 3,78 
associate professionals -private firms 7,57 
technicians 4,19 
foremen 4,43 
service workers -public sector 7,18 
service workers -private firms 8,67 
sales workers 15,14 
personal workers 10,66 
plant and machine operators 9,46 
elementary occupations 18,88 
agricultural workers 17,60 
Source: Enquete Emploi 2011   
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Table A3. Preferences for employment protection (binary logit) 
  employment protection 
  model 1 
unemployed -REF . 
permanent .176 
  (.462) 
fixed term .698 
  (.631) 
OUER -.003 
  (.038) 
unemployed * OUER -REF . 
permanent * OUER .031 
  (.043) 
fixed term * OUER -.018 
  (.056) 
young (18-34) -REF . 
middle age (35-54) .056 
  (.178) 
old (>54) -.763*** 
  (.254) 
female -.284* 
  (.155) 
union .600** 
  (.298) 
education <= bac -REF . 
undergraduate .470** 
  (.202) 
graduate -.067 
  (.290) 
low income -REF . 
middle income .182 
  (.175) 
high income -.858** 
  (.412) 
public sector .178 
  (.208) 
Number of Obs. 781 
Pseudo R-Sq. .053 
Log likelihood -501.3 
Chi 2 56.54 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
 
 
